Abstract-Recently in Chinese Journal of Computers, Kang et al. proposed an efficient CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme, and claimed that it is more efficient in the public/private keys than the famous CS98 and BMW05 CCA secure public key encryption scheme. However, in this paper we will show that their proposal is not secure at all. Furthermore, we improve their scheme to be a secure one and prove its security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Diffie and Hellman [8] introduced the concept of public key cryptography, many public key encryption schemes have been proposed. The security notions for public key encryption scheme have evolved in the last twenty years. Goldwasser and Micali [10] proposed the notion of semantic security (also named IND-CPA), which captures the intuition that an adversary should not be able to obtain any partial information about a message given its encryption. Rackoff and Simon [17] defined the notion of security against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (also named IND-CCA), which captures the intuition that an adversary should not be able to obtain any partial information about the message corresponding to the challenge ciphertext even with the help of a decryption oracle (with the restriction the challenge ciphertext can not be queried to the decryption oracle).
Provable security in a complexity theory sense is one of important requirements of cryptographic schemes. However, such a security level rarely meets with efficiency. To solve the problem, Bellare and Rogaway [1] proposed the concept of random oracle model, where the underlying hash functions can be formalized by an oracle which produces a truly random value for each new query. However, no real function can implement a true random oracle. In fact, it has been shown that some schemes are proven secure in the random oracle model, but are trivially insecure under any instantiation of the oracle [4] .
More and more cryptographers show interesting on constructing efficient CCA-secure PKE in the standard model (without resorting random oracles). Till now, there are serval ways to construct efficient CCA-secure PKE in the standard model. The first practical scheme is proposed by Cramer and Shoup [6] , which further extended by themselves and other cryptographers [7] , [14] , [19] . The second way to construct CCA-secure PKE is the paradigm of IBE transformation, which allows to transform selective-ID CPA-secure identitybased encryption (IBE) into a CCA-secure PKE [2] , [3] , [5] , [13] . Recently, in CT-RSA'10, Lai et al. [15] proposed a novel way to achieve CCA secre PKE without using onetime signature based on the BMW05 paradigm [2] . The third way owns to the concept of lossy trapdoor function introduced by Peikert [16] , and further extended by Rosen and Gilgor [18] and other work. The fourth way is based on verifiable broadcast encryption, which is proposed by Hanaoka and Kurosawa [11] .
A. Our Contribution
Recently in Chinese Journal of Computers, Kang et al. claimed to construct an efficient CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme, and this scheme is more efficient in the public/private keys than the famous CS98 and BMW05 CCA secure public key encryption scheme. However we will show that their proposal is not secure at all. Furthermore, we improve their scheme to be a secure one based on Kiltz 's PKE scheme proposed in PKC'07 [9] .
B. Organization
We organize our paper as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries which are necessary to understand our work. In Section 3, we review and cryptanalysis of Kang et al.'s PKE scheme. In Section 4, we propose our improved CCA secure PKE scheme. We conclude our paper in the last Section.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Definition for PKE Scheme Definition 1: A public key encryption consists of the following algorithms. (PKE.KeyGen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) such that:
On input a security parameter 1 k , the key generation algorithm P-KE.KeyGen outputs a public key P K and a secret key SK.
2) PKE.Enc(P K, m) → C: On input a public key P K and a message m ∈ {0, 1} n , the encryption algorithm PKE.Enc outputs a ciphertext C.
3) PKE.Dec(SK, C) → m: On input a ciphertext C and a secret key SK, the decryption algorithm PKE.Dec outputs a message m ∈ {0, 1} n if the ciphertext is valid; ⊥, otherwise.
We require that for all (P K, SK) output by PKE.KeyGen(1 k ), all m ∈ {0, 1} n , and all C output by PKE.Enc(P K, m) we have that
B. Security Models
A PKE scheme is CCA-secure if the advantage of any PPT adversary A in the following game played between a challenger C and A is negligible in the security parameter k: 1) Setup: C runs PKE.KeyGen(1 k ) to output (P K, SK), and sends P K to A. 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF KANG et al.'S PKE SCHEME

A. Review of Kang et al.'s PKE Scheme
Assume G and G 1 are groups with prime order p, and there exists a bilinear map e : G × G → G 1 . g is the generator of G. The size of the group G and G 1 are defined by the security parameter k. Choose two collision resistent hash function
Choose random a ∈ Z p and compute g 1 = g a , choose random X 1 , X 2 ∈ G. The public keys are (g, g 1 , X 1 , X 2 ) and the secret key is a. 2) PKE.Enc(M): Randomly choose t, τ ∈ Z p , generate the ciphertext
text, the receiver computes w = H 1 (C 0 , C 1 ) and then verifies e(C 1 , X
2 ) = e(g, C 2 ). If it does not hold, then output ⊥, otherwise computes
Here we describe our attack as following: 1) First the adversary A modifies the challenge ciphertext to be
where w = H 1 (C 0 , C 1 ). We can see C is a valid ciphertext for
2) Then the adversary query C to the decryption oracle. And he will get
And then he can guess the right b with probability 1.
IV. IMPROVED CCA SECURE PKE SCHEME
A. Our Construction
Here we describe an improved CCA secure PKE scheme:
Choose random a, b ∈ Z p and compute g 1 = g a , randomly choose X 1 ∈ G. The public keys are (g, g 1 , X 1 ) and the secret key is a. 2) PKE.Enc(M): Randomly choose t, τ ∈ Z p , generate the ciphertext
be the ciphertext, the receiver computes w = H 1 (C 0 , C 1 ) and then verifies e(C 1 , g w 1 X 1 ) = e(g, C 2 ). If it does not hold, then output ⊥, otherwise computes
Remark 1: Actually this scheme is very similar to the scheme proposed by Kiltz in [9] . The only deference lies in the verification algorithm, although Kiltz's scheme can also be verified publicly, but they do it implicitly, while we do it explictly. Thus in our scheme, log X1 g is not needed.
B. Assumption
The challenger randomly choose a collision-resistent hash function H, a, b, d ∈ Z p , generator g of group G and a randomly bit β ∈ {0, 1}. If β = 0, the challenger sends
. The adversary returns β as the guess of β with the help of DDH oracle. The advantage of adversary A solving the GHDH hard problem is defined as
Here the DDH oracle is defined as following; when given the input (g, g a , g b , g c ), if and only if ab = c mod p, the DDH oracle outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0.
Definition 2: The GHDH assumption is that the advantage Adv GHDH A is negligible for all the polynomial time adversaries A.
C. Security Proof
Theorem 1: If GHDH assumption holds and the hash function is target collision resistent, then our PKE scheme is CCAsecure.
Proof: Here we describe an adversary B can use the adversary A who can break the CCA security of our PKE scheme to solve the GHDH problem or break the target collision resistent property of hash function.
Adversary B inputs an instance of the GHDH problem, i.e. B inputs the values (1
l is a random bit string. Adversary B runs adversary A simulating its view as in the original PKE security experiment as follows:
1) KeyGeneration and Challenger. Initially adversary B picks a random value d ∈ Z * p and a target collision resistent hash function H 1 and defines the target ciphertext
as the target tag (associated with the target ciphertext). The value X 1 from the public key pk = (g 1 , X 1 ) is defined as
Note that the public key is identically distributed as in the original PKE.
With each ciphertext C = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) we associate a tag t = H 1 (c 0 , c 1 ). Recall that we call a ciphertext consistent if c 2 = (g
r , where r = log c1 g . Note that the way the keys are setup for a consistent ciphertext we have
Given a consistent ciphertext C = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) with associated tag t = t * . The session key K = H 1 (c r 1 ) can alternatively be computed by Eqn. 3 as
By Eqn. 3 and since t
, distributed as in the original experiment. On the other hand, when W is uniform and independent in {0, 1} l then C * is independent of K * = W in the adversary's view. 2) Adversary B runs A on input (pk, C * ) answering to its queries as follows: Decryption queries. The decryption queries are simulated by B as follows: Let C = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) be an arbitrary ciphertext submitted to the oracle DecO(·). First B performs a consistency check of the ciphertext, i.e. it checks (using the Diffie-Hellman oracle) if (g, g This completes the description of the decapsulation oracle.
We have shown that unless B finds a collision in Target Collision Resistent (Case 2) the simulation of the decryption oracle is always perfect, i.e. the output of the simulated oracle DecO(sk, ·) is identically distributed as the output of Dec(sk, ·). 3) Guess. Eventually, A outputs a guess δ ∈ {0, 1} where δ = 1 means that M b is the correct message. Algorithm B concludes its own game by outputting γ = δ where γ = 1 means that W = H(g ab ) and γ = 0 means that W is random.
This completes the description of adversary B. Thus if A can break the CCA security of our PKE scheme, then B can solve the GHDH problem or break the target collision resistent property of hash function.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we cryptanalyze a recently proposed efficient CCA secure PKE scheme proposed by Kang et al. in Chinese Journal of Computers [12] . Furthermore, we improve their scheme to be a secure one based on Kiltz's work [9] and prove its security.
